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Introduction
As an effective tool for mitigating fi nancial risk, 
insurance has nowadays become a key sector 
of a functioning modern society. Motor insurance 
constitutes the largest line of business of the 
non-life insurance sector in Europe, considering 
its fl eet of around 334 million vehicles registered 
in 2013 (Insurance Europe, 2015). The total 
motor insurance premiums in Europe amounted 
to €123.5 billion in 2013, with a 28% share of 
the total Gross Written Premiums.
The motor insurance line of business 
has two components – the Motor Third Party 
Liability Insurance (MTPL) and the Motor 
Damage insurance. The motor damage policy 
covers the cost of repairing the owner’s vehicle 
following an accident, while the MTPL insurance 
covers the cost of repairing the vehicle of the 
third party. The legal framework of those two 
components varies across Europe, the common 
point being the compulsory nature of the MTPL 
insurance. In some countries it is diffi cult to 
make an explicit distinction between those 
two components when it comes to the legal 
framework, because motor insurance is sold as 
comprehensive insurance (Insurance Europe, 
2015). In other countries, motor damage 
insurance is a voluntary form of insurance, the 
premiums of this category amounting to around 
40% of total gross written premiums in motor 
insurance policies.
Nowadays, when people tend to be more 
mobile in terms of car transport, an increase in 
the risk exposures affecting motor insurance 
can be perceived. The annual mileage 
covered by cars increases because of the road 
infrastructure and the migration of potential 
consumers’ residence towards low traffi c rural 
areas. This phenomenon, initially perceived 
only in developed countries, tends to generalise 
also towards emerging economies, mostly for 
those implied in an integration process to 
a certain community (Busu & Gyorgy, 2016). 
This signifi cant diversifi cation of risks covered 
by the motor insurance market must alert the 
insurance providers to be extremely cautious 
when developing an offer or when assessing 
the risk profi le of potential customers.
The aim of this article is to evaluate the 
key determinants of the decision to subscribe 
to voluntary motor damage insurance. Our 
study wishes to fi ll a need for academic applied 
studies in this area, especially considering 
the fact that motor damage insurance is 
legally compulsory in many countries. Still, for 
insurers from countries where these products 
are voluntary, including Romania, our study 
provides useful information for product design.
By using logit models (binary, multinomial 
and nested), this empirical study emphasizes 
some signifi cant factors affecting consumer 
behaviour when purchasing such an insurance 
policy: the educational background, the 
distance travelled by car, the risk profi le of 
the insurer, the ratio between the owner’s 
income and the value of the car. As control 
variables, we have retained a number of socio-
demographic factors. The main contribution of 
our article is to defi ne two behavioural factors 
in order to explain more thoroughly the decision 
to purchase motor damage insurance. The 
fi rst factor measures the risk profi le of the 
individual in terms of savings and loans, and 
the second one is defi ned as the ratio between 
the estimated price of the car and the revenue 
of the owner.
This study could be relevant for other 
countries where motor damage insurance is 
placed under a voluntary legal framework, as long 
as there are no major behavioural differences in 
the reasoning mechanism of deciding whether to 
purchase such insurance or not.
The remainder of the paper has the following 
structure: Section 1 reviews previous studies on 
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insurance consumers’ behaviour and formulates 
the research hypothesis. Section 2 explains the 
econometric models and the methodology used 
to identify and evaluate the main determinants 
of voluntary motor insurance consumption on 
the Romanian market. Section 3 provides the 
results and discussions of the empirical study, 
and Section 4 draws conclusions and provides 
recommendations and policy implications.
1. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development
Motor insurance and its components 
(compulsory insurance, damage or combined 
policies) are studied from various perspectives 
in the literature. Depending on continent 
or country, the factors considered when 
establishing premiums, as well as the insurance 
distribution channels vary considerably. In some 
North American states, the insurance premium 
is determined by taking into account the driver’s 
history (number of accidents), the annual 
mileage and the driving licence holding period 
(Dwight & Russell, 1995). The insurance system 
based on the number of miles driven annually, 
PAYD (pay-as-you-drive), has also been 
adopted in Europe, in countries such as the UK 
and Italy. Insurers from Ireland, Sweden and UK 
incorporate a credit score of the individual into 
the premium in order to capture the individual’s 
risk aversion (European Commission, 2009). 
Another insurance system frequently used in 
most European countries is the “bonus malus” 
system (European Commission, 2009) applied 
by insurance companies mainly to urge the 
policyholders to become more responsible.
In the academic literature, the theoretical 
research on motor insurance demand is rather 
scarce. For instance, Awunyo-Vitor (2012) has 
examined motor damage insurance drivers in 
Ghana by using a binary logit model. In his study, 
the considered factors were the income of the 
insured, the age, education level and gender of 
the car owner, the age and value of the vehicle, 
as well as the perception of the premium and 
of the claim procedure. He has found that the 
age of the vehicle has a signifi cant negative 
infl uence over the demand of motor damage 
insurance, which means that new vehicles are 
more likely to be insured than old ones. The 
income of the car owners and the value of the 
vehicles were found to be positively related 
to motor damage insurance demand at 1% 
level of signifi cance. Analysis of the persons 
who perceived the premium as satisfactory 
revealed a 70% probability of their buying 
insurance policies, and the probability was 51% 
in the case of those who perceived the claim 
procedure as satisfactory.
By means of a mixed Logit model, Hsu et 
al. (2014) have studied the degree to which the 
automobile insurance claims are affected by the 
characteristics of policyholders and insurance 
policies. They show that replacement value and 
the age of the vehicle are important factors in 
deciding to purchase voluntary motor insurance 
in Taiwan. Peng et al. (2016) have shown 
that the liberalization of automobile insurance 
market in Taiwan in 2009 increased the rate 
competition among insurers and prompted 
them to lower their rates.
Motor insurance consumers reveal 
a multivalent behaviour. In order to explain it, 
some studies focus on identifying the stimuli 
infl uencing individuals to subscribe to such 
policies, while other studies deal with the 
processes taking place inside the consumer’s 
mind. As a type of social behaviour, consumption 
is infl uenced by psychological factors as well. 
Consequently, the third categories of studies 
are those that analyse the consumer data in 
terms of revealed behaviours: repurchase, 
preference, recommendation etc. (Query et 
al., 2007; Parvatiyar & Sheth, 2000). To put it 
differently, the literature stipulates that, much 
like other services, motor insurance must 
also contribute to maximizing the value felt 
by customers so that they may build a lasting 
relationship with the company and reveal a loyal 
behaviour – recommendation, repurchase, 
preference (Kotler & Armstrong, 2001; Gencer 
& Akkucuk, 2017).
As far as consumers’ perspective is 
concerned, Rundmo and Moen (2005) and 
Rundmo and Nordfjaern (2013) have found that 
the most signifi cant predictor of risk perception 
involves evaluations of the probability of 
occurrence of an event, as well as assessments 
of the severity of the event, if it should happen. 
Rundmo and Nordfjaern (2013) have concluded 
that „risk awareness signifi cantly predicts risk 
perception and that risk awareness is directly 
associated with a demand for risk mitigation in 
transport”.
Ioncică et al. (2012) believe that the 
behaviour of insurance consumers is driven 
by different factors such as: marketing-
related factors (e.g. advertising of insurance 
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products, distribution channels), cultural factors, 
economic, demographic and legislative factors 
and the individual characteristics of potential 
insurers. The authors establish that, of all these 
factors, education plays the essential role in the 
decision of purchasing insurance. Sapelli and 
Vial (2003) have found a positive relationship 
between the education level and the probability 
of purchasing voluntary insurance, which means 
that better educated persons are more likely 
to understand the benefi ts of insurance and to 
protect themselves by subscribing to a policy.
Dewar (1998) and Currie (1995) have 
found that gender is also signifi cant for the 
insurance demand. Nevertheless, the result 
may be correlated with income since, given the 
same educational background, women earn on 
average less than men. Liu et al. (2011) prove 
that risk preferences, along with income and 
education, are important predictors of voluntary 
insurance demand. The differences between 
the socio-demographic characteristics are 
correlated with risk perception, thus infl uencing 
the insurance demand and the risk-taking 
behaviour (Ioncică et al., 2012; Kašćelan et al., 
2016).
Depending on customers’ socio-
demographic characteristics (age, income, 
education, gender, driving licence holding 
period etc.) and behaviour (number of accidents 
or claims, number of indemnity payments, type 
of deductible chosen by the policyholder), 
insurance companies segment customers 
to avoid adverse selection (Barone & Bella, 
2004). Adverse selection can be avoided by 
discriminating through prices, which means 
that the same insurance service will generate 
different costs for different consumers because 
they represent heterogeneous risks (Dragos, 
2007). Companies generally avoid customers 
with a bad reputation or those who had a large 
number of accidents in the past. Instead, they 
pursue and win the loyalty of customers who 
demonstrate exemplary behaviour. Saito (2009) 
tests the Japanese auto insurance market for 
the presence of adverse selection in the case 
of bodily injury liability insurance. He fi nds little 
evidence that informational asymmetry leads to 
the ineffi ciency of the auto insurance market, 
even if this is a signifi cant factor for the annuity 
market (Finkelstein & Poterba, 2004) and the 
health insurance market (Höfter, 2006).
An element of overwhelming importance to 
insurance companies is the proper assessment 
of the drivers’ risk profi le. The literature abounds 
in theoretical and empirical approaches using 
econometric, statistical and mathematical 
models to explain the phenomenon of ‘adverse 
selection in insurance’ (Shi et al., 2012; Jindrová 
& Jakubínský, 2015). By asking their customers 
to answer various questions, fi ll out their profi le 
or take part in role-playing, insurers attempt to 
determine as precisely as possible the extent to 
which their customers are either more or less 
inclined to take certain risks (in other words, 
the risk aversion degree of their clients). Based 
on such scenarios, the individuals who are 
willing to take increased risks will fall into the 
category of policyholders who pay a higher 
premium. At the same time, due to their 
increased risk preference, such individuals 
are likely to purchase extra insurance or buy 
higher-premium policies. Cohen (2005) found 
that, on the Israeli motor insurance market, new 
customers with more than three years of driving 
experience and choosing low deductibles for 
motor insurance are associated with more 
accidents and higher losses for the insurer.
Relying on quoted literature and logical 
reasoning, we are in a position to outline the 
following hypothesis:
H1: The risk profi le of the individual 
infl uences the purchasing of voluntary motor 
insurance.
Generally, the economic literature accepts 
the infl uence of the risk profi le of the individual 
on buying any type of voluntary insurance. 
Nevertheless, this mechanism is hard to 
distinguish in applications, because we do not 
have objective values of the risk profi le at 
individual level. The empirical studies measure 
this profi le by different proxy variables like 
age, gender, education, stability at work and 
type of job. In our study we are attempting 
a novel approach, relating the risk profi le to the 
individual’s behaviour regarding saving versus 
borrowing.
H2: The annual distance traveled by car 
infl uences the purchase of voluntary automobile 
insurance.
There is an inner risk profi le of each 
individual, which comes from his human nature. 
Beyond this, there is a specifi c risk associated 
to intense car usage. This behaviour is easily 
noticed by the driver, infl uencing his decision to 
either buy a voluntary motor insurance or not. 
Basically, if the insured considers this risk, he or 
she can generate adverse selection in insurance.
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Variable Variable description
Endogenous variables (for binary logit model)
Y = 1 (Motor Damage) If the person has Motor Damage insurance
Y = 0 (No Motor Damage) If the person does not have Motor Damage insurance
Endogenous variables (for multinomial logit model and nested logit model)
Y = 1 (Motor Damage) If the person has No Motor Damage insurance
Y = 2 (No Motor Damage) If the person does not have Motor Damage insurance. Main 
motivation: owner’s income allows him/her to cover easily the cost 
of potential damage
Y = 3 (No Motor Damage) If the person does not have Motor Damage insurance. Main 
motivation: the likelihood of accident is assessed as being low and 
purchasing an insurance does not seem profi table
Exogenous variables
RISK_PROFILE 1 if total savings exceed by far total value of loans
2 if savings are comparable in amount (max   20%) with loans
3 if total loans do not exceed 40% of the current value of real estate1
4 if total credits exceed 40% of the current value of real estate
CAR_PRICE_RANGE 1 if the estimated car price does not exceed 2,000 Euros
2 if the estimated car price is between 2,000 Euros and 4000 Euros2
3 if the estimated car price exceeds 4,000 Euros
KM/YEAR Mileage covered by the car over the last 12 months (thousands km)
WAGE_RANGE 1 if the net wage does not exceed 800 RON
2 if the net wage is between 800 and 1,700 RON3
3 if the net wage exceeds 1,700 RON
WAGE/CARPRICE_RANGE from -2 to 2. Difference between the variables WAGE_RANGE and 
CAR_PRICE_RANGE
BACHELOR 1 if the owner holds a bachelor’s or higher degree
0 if not
URBAN 1 if the owner’s main residence is in urban area
0 if not
AGE Owner’s age
GENDER 1 if the owner is male
0 if the owner is female
Source: own
Notes: 
1  The cutoff (40%) was taken from bank credit reports. This value allows roughly equal shares for RISK_PROFILE=3 
and RISK_PROFILE=4.
2  The cutoffs (2,000 Euros and 4,000 Euros) ensure roughly equal shares for the three values of the variable CAR_PRI-
CE_RANGE. The data on car value distribution in Romania are taken from statistics of insurance companies and from 
car sales websites.
3  The cutoffs 800 RON and 1,700 RON ensure a balanced distribution among the three groups, in accordance with 
income breakdown in Romania.
Tab. 1: Variables description
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H3: The relationship between the individual’s 
income and the value of the car infl uences the 
purchase of voluntary motor insurance.
We believe that treating the income 
of the individual and the value of the car 
separately cannot lead to conclusive results. 
Essentially, it is the connection between the 
two measurements that counts. An individual 
with a high income compared to the value of 
his car can easily support his own potential 
damages. On the contrary, an expensive car 
connected to an owner with a modest income 
generates a high risk against which it is better 
to be insured.
After briefl y mentioning previous studies 
focusing on motor insurance demand, the 
following paragraphs describe and explain the 
econometric tools to estimate the consumers’ 
behaviour when buying motor damage 
insurance, using a sample of Romanian car 
owners.
2. Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
The data was collected in Cluj County, 
Romania, over the period between September 
– and December 2015, and the tools used in 
the survey were the face-to-face and self-
administered questionnaires. To avoid any 
systematic sampling bias, the respondents 
were chosen randomly. However, they had to 
meet two requirements simultaneously, namely, 
to possess a car and to have a driving licence. 
The questionnaire was run during the periodic 
roadworthiness tests carried out at accredited 
centres/garages. According to current 
Romanian legislation, the roadworthiness test 
is compulsory for all vehicles, regardless of 
the owner’s socio-demographic characteristics 
(income, age, gender, workplace, domicile 
etc.), the value or age of the car, its annual 
mileage or technical condition etc. The sample 
comprised only persons who are car owners 
and their own driving time in the car exceeds 
80% of the car’s overall driving time. If the driver 
had not bought an insurance policy, the authors 
decided to limit the policy choice decision to two 
possible major motivations (Y = 2 and Y = 3, 
see Tab. 1). The drivers falling outside both 
of these defi ned motivations were excluded 
from the sample. As a result of the imposed 
prerequisites, the sample contains 311 fully-
completed questionnaires providing values for 
all studied variables (see Tab. 1).
2.2 Methodology
Three models are used to model the individual 
choice: binary logit, multinomial logit and 
nested logit. The ROC curve is computed in 
order to compare the predictive performance of 
the models.
The Binary Logit Model
The individual’s likelihood to choose (Y = 1) or 
not to choose (Y = 0) a Motor Damage insurance 
policy is modelled by the formula:
 
(1)
where i = 1,N  Index of each individual; xi the 
vector of the exogenous variables; b the the 
vector of the coeffi cients.
The Multinomial Logit Model
The individual’s likelihood to choose one of 
the three alternatives (Y = 1, Y = 2, Y = 3, see 
Tab. 1) is modelled by the formula:
 
(2)
i = 1,N  index of each individual; j = 1,2,3 
index of each alternative. xi the vector of the 
exogenous variables. In the present application, 
all variables vary with respect to individual (i) but 
remain constant with respect to alternatives (j). 
bj the vector of the coeffi cients. Coeffi cients 
vary with respect to alternatives (j). The values 
of bj coeffi cients are interpreted with respect to 
a reference alternative.
The Nested Logit Model
The individual’s likelihood to choose one of the 
three alternatives is modelled by grouping the 
alternatives. L represents the number of groups 
in which the alternatives are included. In each 
group l there are Jl possible choices, indexed 
by j(l). The total number of possible alternatives 
is J = J1 + J2 + ... + Jl. The decision process 
takes place at two levels: inside each group and 
between groups. The variables xl describing 
qualities that are common to choices of the 
same group take values that may vary between 
groups, but not inside the group. The variables 
 xj(l) vary across alternatives. McFadden (1973) 
has proved that a discrete choice model can be 
developed to the utility maximization, based on 
the hypothesis that error terms follow a Weibull 
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distribution. The probability Pr (j/x) of choosing 
the alternative j conditioned by the vector of 
explanatory variables x can be written as:
)/)(Pr()/Pr()/Pr( )(ljxljxlxj   (3)
P (l/x) is the probability of choosing one of the 
L groups:
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For each individual, the probability of 
choosing each alternative can be estimated 
for both the multinomial logit model and the 
nested logit model. In this study all econometric 
estimations are performed using LIMDEP 10 
and its extension NLOGIT 5.
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) 
Curve for Discrete Choice Models
Models are generally compared in the literature 
by means of purely econometric criteria such as 
pseudo R2, parameters signifi cance etc. A highly 
appreciated practitioners’ tool is the ROC curve, 
which assesses the predictive power of binary 
models. Recently the methodology has also 
been developed for Discrete Choice Models 
(Dragos, 2010). The following notation is used:
N11(j)  the number of individuals choosing 
alternative j and that the model predicts 
will choose alternative j.
N1T(j)  the number of individuals choosing 
alternative j.
N00(j)  the number of individuals not choosing 
alternative j and that the model predicts 
will not choose alternative j.
N0T(j)  the number of individuals not choosing 
alternative j.
Therefore, the following defi nitions are 
used:
 the proportion of correct predictions for 
individuals choosing j
N11(j) = sensitivity(j)N1T(j)  
(6)
 the proportion of correct predictions for 
individuals not choosing j:
N00(j) = specifi city(j)N0T(j)  
(7)
This allows the ROC curve to be plotted 
for each alternative j. To plot the global ROC 
curve (for all alternatives), global sensitivity and 
global specifi city are defi ned (Dragos, 2010) as 
follows:
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By comparing the ROC curves of two 
competing models, arguments may be 
advanced with respect to their comparative 
performance. Because the ROC curve for 
Discrete Choice Models has only recently 
been developed, it is not yet implemented in 
the econometric software. All the computations 
and fi gures concerning the ROC curve are 
performed using Microsoft Excel.
3. Results and Discussions
The use of the binary logit model (the results 
reported in Tab. 2) points to several preliminary 
results concerning the behaviour of car owners. 
The alternatives where the individual does not 
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
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have a Motor Damage insurance are grouped 
into a single alternative where Y = 0 (without 
Motor Damage).
The individual’s risk profi le and the level of 
education are the only statistically signifi cant 
variables. The coeffi cient of the variable RISK_
PROFILE has the negative sign, meaning that 
car owners with low risk aversion are less incited 
to subscribe to insurance policies. The positive 
value of the variable BACHELOR indicates that 
university-educated drivers reveal an increased 
level of preference for insurance, this fact 
Exogenous variable Coeffi cient t-value
RISK_PROFILE ** -0.899 5.88
WAGE/CARPRICE_RANGE 0.080 0.60
KM/YEAR 0.014 0.48
BACHELOR * 0.656 2.25
URBAN 0.146 0.53
AGE -0.008 0.77
GENDER -0.150 -0.52
Constant *1.450 1.97
N = 311; Pseudo R2 = 0.129
Source: own
Note: **, * : signifi cant at 1% and 5%
Exogenous variable Coeffi cient t-value
RISK_PROFILE (Y = 1) ** -0.781 -5.41
RISK_PROFILE (Y = 2)  -0.213 -1.68
WAGE/CARPRICE_RANGE (Y = 1)  0.263 1.76
WAGE/CARPRICE_RANGE (Y = 2)  ** 0.394 2.88
KM/YEAR (Y = 1) ** 0.086 2.84
KM/YEAR (Y = 2) ** 0.075 2.64
BACHELOR (Y = 1) * 0.773 2.39
BACHELOR (Y = 2) 0.101 0.31
URBAN (Y = 1) 0.242 0.80
URBAN (Y = 2) -0.115 -0.42
AGE (Y = 1) 0.010 1.18
AGE (Y = 2) -0.005 -0.56
GENDER (Y = 1) 0.047 0.15
GENDER (Y = 2) -0.146 -0.50
N = 311; Pseudo R2 = 0.090
Source: own
Note: **, * : signifi cant at 1% and 5%
Tab. 2: Results of binary logit model (Y = 0 No Motor Damage is the base outcome)
Tab. 3: Results of multinomial logit model (Y = 3 is the base outcome)
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accounting at least partially for their decision to 
subscribe or not to a Motor Damage insurance 
policy. However, if the decision is not to buy an 
insurance policy, the structure of the binary model 
doesn’t reveal anything about the motivations 
behind this option. To better understand 
the mechanism, the range of alternatives is 
extended (Y = 1, 2, or 3, see Tab. 1). Because 
there isn’t any ordered connection between the 
three alternatives, the econometric estimation is 
performed using discrete choice models (such 
as multinomial and nested logit).
Unlike in the case of the binary model, for 
the multinomial logit model (the results reported 
in Tab. 3, the variables WAGE/CARPRICE_
RANGE and KM/YEAR signifi cantly infl uence 
the individual’s decision concerning an 
insurance policy. However, the multinomial logit 
model cannot determine which of the variables 
better explains the two options: a) the decision 
to subscribe or not to an insurance policy, or b) in 
case of non-subscription, what the appropriate 
motivation is? (Y = 2 or Y = 3). To solve this 
problem, the decision must take the form of 
a tree-like pattern (Fig. 1). The coeffi cients of 
different possible specifi cations of the nested 
logit model are estimated.
According to the estimates of the binary 
and multinomial logit models, the variables 
RISK_PROFILE and BACHELOR belong to 
the attributes x1 and account for the decision 
between groups (nests). The variables URBAN, 
AGE and GENDER belong to the attributes xj(1) 
and account for the choice of the alternative in 
the group “without Motor Damage”. By contrast, 
previous models cannot establish a defi nite 
conclusion for the variables WAGE/CARPRICE_
RANGE and KM/YEAR. Consequently, each 
variable must be considered in two ways: a) as 
belonging to x1 attributes to explain the decision 
to subscribe or not an insurance policy (Nested 
Logit 1) and b) as belonging to xj(1) attributes to 
explain, in case of non-subscription, what the 
appropriate motivation may be (Nested Logit 2). 
The estimations are presented in Tab. 4.
Among all models used for estimations, 
Nested Logit 2 is the most adequate in terms 
of classical econometric criteria: the Pseudo 
R2 and the signifi cance of coeffi cients. 
A recently developed tool (Dragos, 2010), the 
Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve for 
Discrete Choice Models, allows us to estimate 
comparatively the predictive power of this 
Fig. 1: The tree structure of the nested logit model
Source: own
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group of models for a single alternative (Fig. 2), 
as well as for all alternatives (Fig. 3).
According to the results of the econometric 
estimations, the ROC curve confi rms that the 
best specifi cation of a model is provided by 
Nested Logit 2. The tree structure of the model 
allows the separate identifi cation of factors 
explaining: a) the decision to subscribe or not to 
an insurance policy (attributes of branch choice 
equations) and b) in case of non-subscription, 
what the appropriate motivation may be 
(attributes of the utility function).
The variables kept preserved in the model 
to explain the decision to subscribe or not are 
both signifi cant. An individual’s willingness 
to incur fi nancial risks and a lower level of 
education increase the probability of his not 
purchasing a Motor Damage insurance policy. 
On the other hand, nor the risk profi le, nor the 
education level can explain the motivation to 
subscribe to such insurance or not.
From the variables preserved in the model 
to explain the motivation for not subscribing to 
insurance, the annual mileage and the ratio 
between the estimated price of the car and the 
revenue of the owner are signifi cant. There 
are two main motives behind the behaviour 
of the uninsured. The fi rst motivation (Y = 2) 
consist in the possibility of easily providing 
coverage from the owner’s available income 
in case of a car accident. The variable WAGE/
CARPRICE_RANGE is statistically signifi cant, 
Nested Logit 1 Nested Logit 2
Exogenous variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Attributes of the utility function
WAGE/CARPRICE_RANGE (Y = 1) … … -0.2980 -1.21
WAGE/CARPRICE_RANGE (Y = 2) … … ** 0.3930 2.99
KM/YEAR (Y = 1) … … -0.0350 -0.71
KM/YEAR (Y = 2) … … * -0.0530 2.28
URBAN (Y = 1) 0.2910 0.77 0.3020 0.80
URBAN (Y = 2) -0.1130 -0.42 -0.1310 -0.48
AGE (Y = 1) -0.0060 -0.53 0.0003 0.03
AGE (Y = 2) -0.0026 0.44 -0.0010 -1.49
GENDER (Y = 1) -0.0440 -0.12 0.2100 0.51
GENDER (Y = 2) -0.1050 -0.40 -0.3610 -1.28
Attributes of Branch Choice Equations (G1 = reference)
RISK_PROFILE (G2) ** 0.9330 6.02 ** 0.9300 6.01
BACHELOR (G2)  * -0.6230 -2.19 * -0.6270 -2.20
WAGE/CARPRICE_RANGE (G2) -0.0650 -0.48 … …
KM/YEAR (G2) -0.0140 -0.49 … …
Inclusive Value Parameters
G1 1.0000 fi x. param. 1.0000 fi x. param.
G2 * -2.1990 -2.04 * -2.0770 -2.00
N = 311
Pseudo R2 = 0.151
N = 311
Pseudo R2 = 0.169
Source: own
Note: **, * : signifi cant at 1% and 5%
Tab. 4: Results of nested logit model (Y = 3 is the base outcome)
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accurately capturing the car owners’ rationale. 
The second motivation (Y = 3) refers to the 
way in which drivers perceive the low likelihood 
of a car accident. Their perception is closely 
correlated with the car mileage (variable KM/
YEAR). The sample includes people who drive 
between four and fi ve thousand kilometres 
annually, sometimes only in rural areas where 
the volume of traffi c is low. The fact that age, 
gender and the urban/rural environment are not 
statistically signifi cant can be surprising, but is 
mainly due to the correlation, to some extent, 
with other regressors. For instance, women 
are less willing than men to incur risks of any 
kind, including car and traffi c-related risks. This 
effect was expressed by the RISK_PROFILE 
variable. A similar effect was detected for the 
variable AGE. While the rural residence of the 
respondents does not have any signifi cance, 
the values of variables like annual mileage, 
net income, and car price are signifi cant. 
Consequently, the H1, H2, and H3 hypotheses 
are accepted. 
The most performant econometric model 
of our study, Nested Logit 2, may well lie 
behind the simulation of commercial policies 
Fig. 2: Comparing ROC curves for the alternative Y = 1
Source: own
Fig. 3: Comparing ROC curves for all three alternatives
Source: own
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Fig. 4: Probability of choosing alternatives with respect to RISK_PROFILE
Source: own
Fig. 5: Probability of choosing alternatives with respect to annual mileage
Source: own
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on insurance. We simulated the effect exerted 
by the variation of each explanatory variable on 
the probability of choosing one out of the three 
alternatives. The remaining regressors are 
supposed to be constant, taking the average 
value in the sample (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5).
The variation of the driver’s risk profi le 
has the strongest effect on the probability of 
subscribing an insurance policy (Fig. 4). By 
contrast, the perception of the probability of 
being involved in an accident and therefore of 
choosing the third alternative is most affected 
by the annual mileage (Fig. 5).
Conclusions
Meeting and satisfying customers’ changing 
preferences, expectations and needs represent 
a major challenge for insurance companies. 
Therefore, all insurance providers must 
innovate on a regular basis and come up with 
new ways of approaching the target segments 
and of promoting their offers. Companies should 
also attempt to increase customers’ awareness 
of risk exposure when driving irresponsibly, 
as well as their understanding of the negative 
impact of this on themselves and on the society 
at large.
The international literature on the 
individual’s behaviour when purchasing motor 
insurance appears rather scarce, not least 
because in many countries the two insurance 
components – the compulsory (MTPL) and the 
optional (Motor Damage) – are sold together 
as one package. The relevance of this analysis 
only for voluntary insurance – where the 
customer decides to subscribe or not to a motor 
insurance policy – points to this state of affairs. 
While previous studies estimated the risk profi le 
only through proxy variables such as income, 
age or gender, without accounting for any 
behavioural aspects, our study has successfully 
integrated the risk profi le of the policyholders as 
a self-standing explanatory variable.
In emerging economies, the upward trend 
of the workforce mobility entails more frequent 
and longer commutes between home and 
workplace. The awareness of risk exposures 
(the perception of the probability of being 
involved in a car accident) will increase given 
the heavy road traffi c. Even if, from a legal 
point of view, motor damage insurance remains 
voluntary, its share of the non-life segment 
is expected to increase signifi cantly. The 
percentage of university-educated people is 
also an upward trend, with the educational 
aspect instrumental in rendering these 
individuals more aware of the advantages of an 
insurance system compared to self-insurance. 
The other variables in the study (income, age, 
gender) are either statistically insignifi cant or 
relatively constant in time. Therefore, they are 
not expected to exert any impact on motor 
insurance consumption in the near future.
To improve the profi tability of this insurance 
category and because of the high number of 
road casualties, we consider the introduction 
of a common database for all motor damage 
insurers imperative. This database should 
provide, for the benefi t of all potential insureds, 
the individuals’ characteristics such as their risk 
perception, the properties of their car and the 
history of their road casualties. The database 
would help reduce the phenomenon of migration 
in the case of “high risk” policyholders. It refers 
to individuals with a bad history of past claims 
who try to avoid penalties charged for repeated 
damage by changing the insurer.
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Abstract
ESTIMATING CONSUMERS’ BEHAVIOUR IN MOTOR INSURANCE USING 
DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS
Cristian Mihai Dragos, Simona Laura Dragos
Insurance is a fi nancial service in which consumption is highly affected by the characteristics of 
the potential buyer and his perceptions about the offered product. Motor insurance with its two 
components – the Motor Third Party Liability Insurance (MTPL) and the Motor Damage insurance 
– constitutes the largest line of business of the non-life insurance sector in Europe. The present 
study models the voluntary motor damage insurance consumer behaviour using discrete choice 
models, hypothesizing a hierarchical and a non-hierarchical decision. The sample consists of 311 
car owners from Cluj County, Romania. The econometric estimations use binary logit, multinomial 
logit and nested logit models. The predictive power of these models is compared by means of the 
Receiver Operating Characteristic curve for discrete choice models. The results reveal that the main 
factors affecting the purchase of a voluntary motor insurance policy are risk preference/aversion, 
the distance travelled by car, the driver’s education level and the ratio between the driver’s income 
and the car price. In contrast to previous studies who estimated the risk profi le only through proxy 
variables without accounting for any behavioural aspects, our study has successfully integrated 
the risk profi le of the policyholders as a self-standing explanatory variable. Since the explanatory 
variables are representative not only for a particular geographical area, the highlighted behaviour 
may be applied to all cases where motor damage insurance is voluntary.
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